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1. INTRODUCTION 
 
 The collapse of the centrally planned economies of Eastern Europe in the early 1990s 
prompted region-wide market-oriented reforms in which privatization of state-owned 
financial institutions played a key role. For only a decade the once exclusively state-run 
financial sector, witnessed dramatic opening to private domestic ownership and strategic 
foreign presence. Although the process of privatization is still ongoing in some countries and 
recently completed in others, I evaluate privatization policies as a prerequisite for successful 
transition to market economy. The study examines the effect of privatizing banks to strategic 
foreign investors on bank performance as opposed to privatizing to domestic owners in the 
first and the second wave of European Union accession countries, namely, Bulgaria, Czech 
Republic, Estonia, Hungary, Latvia, Lithuania, Poland, Romania, Slovakia, and Slovenia. 
The increasingly frequent implementation of privatization worldwide has spawned a 
variety of studies of the effect of ownership on bank performance. Most of the literature 
concerning the effect of ownership on bank performance covers the similar and older process 
in Latin America, and other developed and developing countries. Foreign ownership 
improved the performance of provincial banks in Argentina but the process was not rapid due 
to an initial process of adapting to the market (Clarke and Cull, 1999). In Nigeria 
privatization failed to deliver because of the weak regulatory environment (Beck, Cull and 
Jerome, 2003). On the contrary, given the overall economic stability and stringent regulation, 
Italian privatized banks did not take long to outperform state-run banks (Frabullini and 
Hester, 2001). The recent literature on the transitional states shows that as a rule, banks sold 
to strategic foreign investors do better than these sold to domestic owners. Bonin, Wachtel 
and Hasan (2003) demonstrate that banks privatized to strategic foreign investors achieve 
higher levels of profitability than state banks and are even comparable in performance to 
foreign greenfield banks. Banks for which a foreign investor was chosen also exhibit 
improved portfolio quality (Abel and Siklos, 2002). However, they also have higher initial 
costs due to restructuring (Bonin and Wachtel, 2003), but eventually they achieve better cost 
efficiency (Weill, 2003) than these sold to domestic owners. 
Despite the presence of extensive literature on the benefits of privatization, few 
studies examine explicitly the effect of foreign ownership on privatized banks in transitional 
countries. Most available works compare unprivatized with privatized entities regardless of 
the type of new ownership, or domestic with foreign banks irrespective of their ownership 
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history. For these few, which explicitly focus on the performance of banks privatized to 
foreign investors as compared to these sold to domestic owners, three major drawbacks 
preclude the emergence of a uniform conclusion. Firstly, many studies use a very early 
dataset; often just a couple years after privatization when the effect of ownership has not 
picked momentum yet and the results it yields are inconclusive. Secondly, a sizeable portion 
of the research focuses on just a handful of cases within each country or on a limited number 
of countries which may not be representative for the whole region of Central and Eastern 
Europe (Bonin and Wachtel, 2003 and Weill, 2003). Finally, the different empirical methods 
employed yield contradicting outcomes. This research aims to amend for these shortcomings. 
It expands the area surveyed by including ten countries and covering most of the banks 
operating within each one. It also uses the most recent data available from 2002. By utilizing 
two different approaches, this study attempts to achieve a degree of robustness of the results. 
 
2. DATA 
2.1. THE DATA SOURCE 
 
Data comes from Banker’s Almanac which contains yearly balance sheet data and 
profit and loss data as well as the ownership type for individual banks in a large number of 
countries. It covers 170 countries and the banks included represent about 90% of the total 
banking assets in a particular country. Additionally, it goes back to six years back from the 
most recent balance sheet reported. For each bank, the Banker’s Almanac provides coverage 
on the nature of services provided, years of operations and major events in the development 
of the bank, mainly, mergers and acquisitions, as well as a description of the current 
ownership structure. It goes on to report two balance sheets for each bank: one compiled by 
Fitch and the other provided by the bank itself according to internal accounting standards. 
Since the Fitch balance sheets are superior in coverage and comparability, I relied on them 
for constructing my dataset. 
The main limitations of the dataset were twofold. First, although it provided 
information on the current ownership, it did not cover ownership history, which did not 
permit accurate classification of banks into different ownership categories for the period 
surveyed. To amend for this shortage, I conducted extensive background research of the 
history of each bank that involved contacting the respective financial supervision agencies 
3
Dimova: The Benefits of Privatizing Banks to Strategic Foreign Investors:
Published by Digital Commons @ IWU, 2006
   
 4
and individual banks to construct a detailed picture of the ownership changes in the 
development of each bank. 
 The second drawback was incompleteness. For quite a few banks the data either 
spanned a period of less than six years or had individual observations missing. The 
incompleteness factor was heavily tilted toward underperforming institutions so we expect an 
upward bias of the estimations. Additionally, some branches of foreign banks did not report 
separate balance sheets for the branch in the given country but rather an aggregate balance 
sheet for the parent entity. Due to the inability to separate the individual branches from the 
parent entity, these observations were removed from the dataset. In addition, all incomplete 
bank-year observations were also deleted. As a result, the analysis is based on 358 bank-year 
observations for the Ratio Approach and on 587 bank-year observations for the Stochastic 
Frontier Approach. However, even with the removal of incomplete observations the dataset 
covers approximately 80% of the banking sector in each country and could be deemed fairly 
representative. 
 
2.2. DATA UTILIZATION 
 
In order to avoid currency conversions, which would increase the errors in variables, I 
employed ratios of the financial indicators rather than the nominal values. The additional 
positive effect of this conversion is that it reduces the variance that would have been caused 
by outlier cases.  
 Therefore, for the Ratio Approach I have extracted some of the main financial 
indicators and have converted them into the following ratios: administrative costs over total 
assets, cash over total assets, market share over loans, net interest margin, ROA, ROE and 
loan loss reserves over loans (LLR). LLR attempts to proxy for non-performing loans (NPL) 
since few banks reported actual percentage of NPL.  
 For the computation of the efficiency scores the Stochastic Frontier Approach relies 
on the following ratios: total costs to the price of borrowed funds, profits to the price of 
borrowed funds, and administrative costs to the price of borrowed funds. The level variables 
included are total bank output, the price of loaned funds and the bank’s equity. All variables 
are converted to dollar figures corrected for inflation to achieve comparability.  
 The ownership specifications merit more attention. A financial institution is deemed 
foreign owned if the at least 51% of its assets are held by foreign investors. In short, the paper 
utilizes the ”majority ownership benchmark” rather than individual country criteria for 
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foreign control which range from 20% in Poland to 50% in Hungary. The main reason behind 
the decision to disregard state definitions is that only when owners control the majority of the 
stake, are they able to wield influence over the bank’s policy. 
 Banks are separated into six categories along ownership lines: foreign greenfield, 
foreign privatized, foreign M&A, domestic de novo, domestic privatized, and state. A bank is 
deemed foreign greenfield if it is initially established with foreign investment and remains in 
this category even when transferred to another foreign owner since the type of ownership 
does not change. However, if a private domestic bank is sold to foreign owners, it changes 
category to foreign M&A. Similarly, domestic de novo banks are banks that have been kept 
only in private domestic hands. The categories foreign privatized, domestic privatized and 
state are self-explanatory. The dummy variable for ownership type takes one if the bank is of 
ownership type i during year j, and zero otherwise. 
 A foreign owner is classified as such if its assets come from a non-transitional 
country. Based on this assumption, Hansabanka in Latvia is classified as domestic, although 
it is owned by Hansapank based in Estonia. This decision is motivated by the fact that 
transitional countries share similar political and economic heritage and cannot offer 
significantly different banking expertise to each other.  
 Majority ownership does not necessarily indicate the presence of a single majority 
owner. In cases of multiple owners, the stakes of several minority foreign owners may be 
aggregated to yield a majority position for foreign owners as a group even though no single 
owner has a majority stake. 
Finally, classifying ownership was a formidable task due to the lengthy transitions 
from one ownership type to another. Quite often the state ceded control over a bank long after 
the privatization contract was signed. Therefore, this study registers change in ownership 
when the actual majority share portfolio is transferred and not when the deal was reached.  
 
2.3. BASIC FEATURES OF THE DATA 
 
The ownership table shows that in the period from 1997 to 2002 banks in Central and 
Eastern Europe exhibited diverse forms of ownership and no single ownership type prevailed. 
Somewhat surprisingly the most popular ownership type is that of domestic de novo banks 
that comprise about 23% of the sample. Foreign greenfield establishments come second with 
22% of the observation. The statistics show that state ownership was still prevalent during the 
six-year period and almost one fifth of the cases were in governments’ hands. Furthermore, 
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while in 13% of the observations banks switched ownership from domestic private to foreign 
private, there are absolutely no cases in the opposite direction. Finally, the statistics indicated 
that despite widespread negative sentiments towards foreign investors, more banks were 
privatized to foreigners than to domestic owners. The two groups constitute 12% and 5% 
respectively of the cases. 
 
Table 2.1.: Ownership Statistics for Ten Eastern European Countries 
for the Period 1997-2002 
  N Mean Std. Dev. Min. Max. 
Foreign Greenfield 358 0.215 0.411 0 1 
Foreign Privatized 358 0.120 0.326 0 1 
Foreign M&A 358 0.134 0.341 0 1 
Domestic De Novo 358 0.232 0.422 0 1 
Domestic Privatized 358 0.050 0.219 0 1 
State-owned 358 0.193 0.395 0 1 
  
The predominance of domestic de novo banks does not imply that this ownership 
group controls the biggest slice of the financial sector. Rather, the simple statistics is 
misleading, since they do not account for bank size. Domestic greenfield establishments tend 
to be small relative to foreign greenfield and privatized entities.  
 
        Table 2.2.: Financial Statistics for the Ratio Approach 
  N Mean Std. Dev. Min.  Max. 
Administrative Costs over Assets 358 0.350 3.199 0.008 36.772 
Cash over Total Assets  358 0.807 8.915 0.000 126.956 
Loans over Total Assets 358 3.251 30.108 0.010 372.815 
Market Share over Loans 358 0.000 0.001 0.000 0.009 
Net Interest Margin 358 0.074 0.132 -0.169 1.390 
Return on Assets 358 0.111 1.926 -3.816 35.655 
Return on Equity 358 -1.891 36.246 -685.60 5.356 
Loan Loss Reserves over Loans 358 0.166 1.032 0.000 18.046 
 
The financial statistics for the Ratio Approach shows that the ratio of administrative 
costs over total assets exhibits wide swings in value from almost zero to 37. The latter is 
clearly an outlier case since the mean is at modest 0.35. The mean of the ratio of cash over 
total assets is 0.8, however an outlier case reaches the exorbitant value of 127. On average, 
banks made loans roughly a little over three times their total assets. The ratio of market share 
to loans shows that most banks control a relatively small share of the financial sector. The 
mean of the net interest margin is 0.074 which suggests that few banks enjoyed a wide 
spread. The average bank in the transitional region reached the promising return on assets 
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(ROA) of 11%, however, the average return on equity (ROE) is precariously skewed 
downward by a single outlier case. The loan loss reserves serve as a proxy for non-
performing loans since few banks reported actual loan losses. Somewhat surprisingly, despite 
the heightened risk of default on loans in the economically and politically fragile transitional 
states, the average bank provisioned loan loss reserves only 17% of the actual loans given.  
 
   Table 2.3.: Country Statistics for Ten Eastern European Countries for 
   the period 1997-2002 
N Mean Std. Dev. Min.  Max. 
GDP Growth 60 3.483 3.260 -6.000 10.000 
nflation Rate 60 29.733 136.741 0.000 1058.00 
Real Interest Rate 60 4.183 12.136 -82.000 15.000 
 
Finally, macroeconomic country statistics provide vital information about the setting 
in which the banks operated. The typical transitional country averaged 3.5% annual GDP 
growth. The early years saw the biggest slump in GDP in Romania and in the same period 
Estonia achieved the highest rate for the Central and Eastern European region. Inflation rates 
were precariously high even for the average transitional country at 30%. Bulgaria, the outlier 
case, registered hyperinflation at the rate of 1058% in 1997 and the same year brought 155% 
inflation in Romania. Real interest rates averaged the acceptable 4% rate. However, again in 
Bulgaria in 1997 inflation heavily taxed deposits at a negative  –82% real interest rate.  
Despite the obvious presence of outlier cases, I did not remove them from the sample 
for two reasons. First, removing them would further shrink the sample pool, and second, a 
quick glance at the dataset shows that these outlier cases are strongly related to the ownership 
type and removing them from the dataset would yield skewed results about the effect of 
ownership on performance.  
 
      Table 2.4.: Financial Statistics for the Stochastic Frontier Approach in Millions  
      of US Dollars. 
 N Mean St. Dev. Min. Max. 
Total Costs 587 260.156 1573.983 0.855 18736.79 
Total Profits 587 5458.123 710.313 1.000 10821.37 
Total Output 587 2327.918 15834.31 8.300 215540.5 
Equity 587 329.995 2535.099 0.024 38481.97 
Interest Paid to Total Costs 587 0.506 4.825 0.006 0.719 
Admin. Costs to Total Costs 587 0.438 4.425 0.008 0.774 
Interest Received 587 238.87 1381.52 0.478 19945.89 
Market Share 587 0.087 0.140 0.001 0.944 
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  The total expenditures, profits, output and the interest received for the SFA Approach 
varies from single digit million dollars to double digit billion dollars. The level of equity dips 
from positive double digit billions to almost zero. The share of interest paid and 
administrative costs of total costs show similar movements from almost zero to as much as 
72% and 77% respectively of the total expenditure. Finally, the average bank controls only 
9% of the market share while the biggest one is a total monopoly holding as much as 94% of 
the financial assets in the country. 
 
               Table 2.5.: Efficiency Scores Statistics in Percentages 
  N Mean St. Dev. Min. Max. 
Profit Efficiency Score 587 58.186 0.367 39.914 62.208 
Cost Efficiency Score 587 29.336 0.472 10.450 49.222 
 
Finally, the efficiency scores do not exhibit wide swings in value. Most scores are 
clustered around the mean values and no bank manages to reach very high efficiency. Banks 
appear to be more successful in achieving profit efficiency than cost efficiency. The lowest 
profit efficiency score is 40% while the highest is 62%. Likewise, the lowest cost efficiency 
score is 10% while the highest is 49%. 
3. METHODOLOGY 
I propose two methods for estimating the effect of bank ownership on bank 
performance: the Ratio Approach and the Stochastic Frontier Approach. Since both methods 
suffer several drawbacks, I utilize both to achieve a degree of robustness of the results.  
 
3.1. THE  RATIO APPROACH 
 
 The Ratio Approach (RA) is a simple econometric model that employs various 
measures of performance and quality of the bank and examines their dependence on 
managerial and external factors. The underlying model studies the effect of ownership and 
macroeconomic factors on various performance estimates: 
 
(1)     PERFORMANCE = α + βi INTERNAL CONTROLS + γ TIME +  
 
         + δi OWNERSHIP + θi MACRO CONTROLS +  
        
         + κi INTERACTION CONTROLS  + λi COUNTRY 
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Since converting all financial indicators to a common currency base would increase 
the measurement error, this study adopts the ratio approach in which all variables are ratios 
rather than absolute values. This is even more necessary for the transitional economies where 
most banks operated in high inflationary environments. Another positive by-product of this 
approach is that it controls for biases that could arise from the scope of operation of each 
bank. 
Several indicators are used to measure PERFORMANCE. Measures such as 
administrative costs over assets, net interest margins, interest over deposits, interest over 
loans, ROA and ROE are measure performance on the financial side. Since the percentage of 
non-performing loans (NPL) is reported for very few banks, the loan loss reserves (LLR) 
attempt to serve as a proxy for it and to capture the quality of individual bank portfolios.  
The equation controls for internal factors that could also affect performance, the most 
prominent of which is the market share of the particular entity in addition to the main services 
provided by the bank besides other factors. OWNERSHIP is a matrix of dummies each of 
which takes the value of 1 if the bank is of ownership type i during the particular year and 0 
otherwise.  
Additionally the equation contains several macro controls that account for economy 
wide factors that could affect performance regardless of the ownership type. The main 
indicators included are annual GDP growth, annual inflation, and the real interest rate. 
Finally, the model allows for interactions between some of the exogenous variables included 
and contains a matrix of dummies for the country of operation of each bank. 
This simplistic estimation could suffer from several flaws, the main of which is 
endogeneity. In most countries, the ownership type is not independent of the bank 
performance and as explained in the process overview, there are a host of political and 
economic factors that predetermine to a significant extent who ends up controlling the 
majority share of the bank. Earlier studies attempted to use bank size as a proxy for foreign 
ownership since the first banks to be sold to foreign owners were big influential entities. 
However, in recent years, this pattern has been broken and market size does not appear to be 
related to the ownership type. 
To amend for this shortage, the dummy matrix COUNTRY attempts to partly account 
for the different privatization objectives that prevailed in each country and that ultimately 
influenced the ownership type of privatized banks. The size of the bank effectively accounted 
for by the market share control also wields control over the selection of the future owner 
since in many countries governments are reluctant to cede control over a dominant bank. 
9
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Additionally, COUNTRY jointly with the MACRO CONTROLS partly captures the political 
and economic environment of each country that affects the number of domestic private banks 
and foreign greenfield establishments. However, there are individual factors that affect the 
ownership type of each bank that remain unaccounted for. Since no model could effectively 
capture them, in an attempt to achieve a degree of robustness of the results I propose a second 
model for determining the effect of ownership on bank performance.  
 
3.2. THE STOCHASTIC FRONTIER APPROACH 
 
The Stochastic Frontier Approach (SFA) estimates the degree of cost and profit 
efficiency each bank achieves. The farther the actual costs or profits are from the optimal 
point, the less efficient the financial institution is. Thus, the efficiency score measures how 
close a bank’s cost or profit is to what a best-practice bank’s cost or profit would be for 
producing the same bundle of outputs.  
Several techniques have been proposed in the literature to measure efficiency using 
frontier approaches. Non-parametric techniques such as the Data Envelopment Analysis 
(DEA) utilize linear programming techniques to compute efficiency scores. They do not 
require any assumptions regarding the functional form of the frontier, allowing the frontier to 
tightly envelop the data. However, their main weakness is that they do not allow for any error 
in the data: the entire distance to the frontier is considered as inefficiency, resulting in the 
inclusion of exogenous events in the inefficiency term (Weill (2003)). 
Parametric approaches, such as the stochastic frontier approach, use econometric tools 
to estimate the efficiency frontier. Their main weakness is that they impose more structure on 
the shape of the frontier by specifying a functional form for the cost function. However, their 
major advantage is that they allow for random error, which improves the estimation of 
efficiency scores. But this allowance creates a new problem: the separation of random error 
from inefficiency. Parametric approaches differ in the method adopted to separate random 
error from inefficiency. The stochastic frontier approach uses a composed error model in 
which inefficiency is assumed to follow an asymmetric distribution (e.g. half-normal, 
truncated normal. gamma) while the random error is assumed to follow a symmetric 
distribution (usually normal). The rationale is that inefficiency cannot diminish costs and thus 
must have an asymmetric distribution, whereas random error can add or subtract cost and 
then have a symmetric distribution.  
10
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Another problem that is inherent to all efficient frontiers is the size of the sample: 
since efficiency scores are relative measures of performance, the larger the sample, the better, 
the comparison will be. Fortunately, the ten transitional countries offer enough observations 
for reliable conclusions 
Following the applications from Berger and Mester (1997), Kumbakhar and Lovell 
(2000), Weill (2003) and Bonin, Hassan and Wachtel (2003), I adopt the stochastic frontier 
approach to estimate the cost efficiency scores. Cost efficiency measures how close a bank’s 
cost is to what a best-practice bank’s cost would be for producing the same bundle of outputs. 
It then provides information on losses in the production process and on the optimality of the 
chosen mix of inputs. The stochastic frontier methodology, based on a multiproduct translog 
cost function, is adopted to calculate cost and profit efficiency scores for the 596 bank-year 
observations in the sample. 
The basic model assumes that total cost deviates from the optimal cost by a random 
disturbance, v, and an inefficiency term, u. Thus the cost function is  
 
(2)      TC = f (Y, P) + ε                 
 
Where TC represents total cost, Y is the vector of outputs, P is the vector of input prices and ε 
is the error term which is the sum of u and v. u is the one-sided component representing cost 
inefficiencies, meaning the degree of weakness of managerial performance. v is a two-sided 
component representing random disturbances, reflecting bad or good luck and measurements 
errors. u and v are independently distributed. v is assumed to have a normal distribution and 
variance σ2. Several distributions have been proposed, however this model follows the 
convention adopted by Weill (2003) and utilizes the gamma distribution.  
 The complete model estimates a system of equations composed of a translog cost 
function and its associated input cost share equation derived using Shepard’s Lemma. 
Estimation of this system adds degrees of freedom and results in more efficient estimates than 
just the single equation cost function.  
Since the share equations sum to unity, I solve the problem of singularity of the 
disturbance covariance matrix of the share equations by omitting one input cost share 
equation from the estimated system equations. Standard symmetry constraints are imposed. 
Normalizing total costs and the price of labor by the price of borrowed funds imposes 
homogeneity conditions. Thus, the complete cost model is the following: 
 
11
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(3)   ln (TC/ w2) = β0 + α ln y  +  β ln (w1/w2) + γ ln (w1/w2) ln y + 
+ ln EQUITY + ∑ COUNTRY + ε 
(4)  S = δ ln (TC/w2)/ δ ln w1 = β0 + β ln (w1/w2) +  γ ln y + η
 
where TC is total costs, y  is the bank output, w1 is the input price, w2 is price of borrowed 
funds, EQUITY is total equity, COUNTRY is a matrix of dummies that equal 1 when the bank 
operates in country i and 0 otherwise. S is the input cost share, η is error term independent of 
ε.  
 For the definition of inputs and outputs, the intermediation approach is adopted that 
considers deposits as an input. The output included is loans measured by the currency volume 
that the bank held each year. The inputs, whose prices are used to estimate the cost frontier, 
include non-earning expenses and the price of borrowed finds, i.e. interest paid on deposits. 
The price of non-earning expenses w1 is measured by the ratio of personnel and other non-
interest bearing expenses to total assets, as data on the number of employees and separate 
personnel expenses are not available. The price of borrowed funds w2 is measured by the ratio 
of interest paid to total assets. 
 The level of equity is included to control for differences in risk preferences. If 
managers from one bank are more risk-averse than the managers from another bank, they can 
hold a higher level of equity than the cost-minimizing level. Consequently, by omitting the 
level of equity, we may consider a bank as inefficient even if it behaves optimally, given the 
risk preferences of its managers. If, for instance, bank managers of foreign-owned banks are 
more risk-averse than the managers of domestic-owned banks, their performance would be 
underestimated if equity is not controlled for in the cost efficiency model.  
 Berger and Mester (1997) provide another reason for the inclusion of equity in the 
efficiency model. Bank insolvency risk depends on the equity available to absorb losses. 
Consequently, the insolvency risk affects the bank’s costs through the risk premium that the 
bank has to pay in order to borrow funds. This issue has particular importance in transitional 
economies where the insolvency risk of banks can be particularly great, due to the high 
proportion of non-performing loans in the loan portfolio.  
The standard profit function uses essentially the same specifications with a few 
changes. First the dependent variable for the profit function replaces ln (TC/w2) with ln 
[(π/w2) + |(π/w2)min| + 1], where |(π/w2)min| indicates the absolute value of the minimum value 
of (π/w3) over all banks in the period. Thus, the constant θ = |(π/w2)min|  + 1 is added to every 
12
Undergraduate Economic Review, Vol. 2 [2006], Iss. 1, Art. 1
http://digitalcommons.iwu.edu/uer/vol2/iss1/1
   
 13
firm’s dependent variable in the profit function so that the natural log is taken of a positive 
number, since the minimum profits are typically negative (Berger and Mester (1997)). Thus, 
for the firm with the lowest value of (π/w2), the dependent variable will be ln (1) = 0. 
Furthermore, the terms containing the variable output quantity ln (y) are replaced by the 
corresponding output price, ln (p). The standard profit function is: 
 
 (5)    π + θ =f (V, P) + ε 
 
Where π represents profits, V is the vector of output prices, P is the vector of input prices and 
ε is the error term which is again the sum of u and v. This the complete profit model is the 
following: 
(6)  ln [(π/w2) + |(π/w2)min| + 1]  = β0 + α ln p  +  β ln (w1/w2) +  
        +  γ ln (w1/w2) ln p + ln EQUITY + ∑ COUNTRY + ε  
 
(7)  S = δ ln [(π/w2) + |(π/w2)min| + 1]/ δ ln w1 =  
    = β0 + β ln (w1/w2) + γ ln p + η
 
Here p is the bank output price. The output price indicator employed is the interest rate 
received on loans.
 The two equations for the profit and cost functions are estimated using the Iterative 
Seemingly Unrelated Regression (ITSUR) that generates maximum likelihood estimates. The 
estimated residuals capture the degree of profit and cost inefficiency in the ideal case when 
no unexplained disturbances occur. The obtained inefficiency scores are converted to 
efficiency scores and are subsequently regressed on ownership structures controlling for time 
and the size of the bank since these are shown to affect bank efficiency. The following model 
is estimated: 
 
              (8)     EFF = α + β Foreign Greenfield + γ Foreign Privatized +  
+ δ Foreign M&A + ζ Domestic De Novo + θ Domestic Privatized + 
+ λ Market Share + µ Time 
 
Finally, the cost and profit efficiency variables fall in the interval between 0 and 1, 
making the dependent variable a limited dependent variable. Therefore, the models are 
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estimated using a Tobit regression model rather than an OLS regression model that would 
provide biased results.  
 
4. EMPIRICAL RESULTS 
4.1. PREDICTED RESULTS 
 
For many of the variables, predicting the signs of the coefficients is a fairly 
complicated task due to different forces working in opposite directions. Nevertheless, some 
patterns emerge. The ratio of cash to total assets is expected to have a negative effect on 
almost all performance measures, since cash constitutes non-earning assets and the greater 
amount of cash a bank holds the less its earning assets are. Increased net interest margin and 
loan loss reserves tend to be associated with higher administrative costs since they increase 
servicing costs. 
 The ratio of market share to loans is expected to exert positive influence over 
administrative costs and the performance measures. A greater ratio of market share to loans is 
expected to increase loans as a share of total assets, ROA and ROE due to the bandwagon 
effect. The net interest margin is also expected to rise due to greater market power associated 
with a larger market share, and the loan loss reserves could increase reflecting a more diverse 
portfolio and better ability to provision for non-performing loans.  
The ratio of loans over assets is expected to have a negative effect on net interest 
margin since a lower interest spread would affect positively the volume of loans. On the other 
hand, its effect on loan loss reserves is ambiguous: more loans could increase the necessity 
for insurance against non-performing loans (NPL), but it could also reduce them if the quality 
of the portfolio is improving.  
Loan loss reserves reduce all profitability measures since they subtract directly from 
earning assets, but would increase as the interest spread widens and servicing loans becomes 
more difficult. Higher loan loss reserves are associated with increased servicing expenditures 
that raise administrative costs. 
The effect of ownership types could be quite contradicting since they depend at large 
on underlying priorities of the management and previous bank practices. The ratio of 
administrative costs to total assets is expected to be lower for banks under predominantly 
foreign ownership with the effect most pronounced for foreign greenfield establishments. 
Foreign privatized banks are expected to gradually reduce the share of administrative costs to 
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total assets as they shrink the oversized personnel, a legacy from state-ownership and 
increase the productivity of the retained staff through training or replacement. Domestic de 
novo banks and banks privatized to domestic owners are expected also to aggressively strive 
to reduce administrative costs. The only groups that may have higher administrative costs are 
state banks since they would retain workers for political reasons without regard to profit-
maximization. 
The ratio of loans to total assets mainly depends on individual banks’ priorities; 
however, consistent with profit-maximization foreign-held entities are expected to have a 
higher share of loans. The effect of domestic de novo and state ownership is ambiguous since 
on one hand the behavior of private domestic banks may also be consistent with profit-
maximization, but they may also occupy a niche of the industry and limit to servicing a select 
number of customers. Despite their big size and government backing, state banks may exhibit 
lower lending due to outdated banking practices and unattractive lending terms.  
The sign of ownership with the dependent variable is the net interest margin is 
ambiguous at best. While foreign banks are assumed to exhibit better management expertise 
and thus realize higher profits, the liberalization of the market increases competitiveness that 
brings the margin down and the overall effect is not clear.  
Both ROA and ROE are expected to increase for privately held banks regardless of 
the ownership type. The difference, however, lies in the degree of superior performance. 
Foreign greenfield banks are expected to improve performance most closely followed by 
foreign privatized and the respective domestic types due to lack of inherited problems from 
previous managements. Both types of privatized banks may exhibit initial negative returns as 
they restructure a former state bank but eventually, the returns are expected to increase due to 
improved management and internal monitoring. Overall the sign of ownership for privatized 
banks will be strongly correlated with time elapsed since privatization. State banks are the 
only group that is expected to underperform since their policy is mainly dictated by political 
considerations.  
The effect of ownership on the ratio of loan loss reserves to loans runs mainly along 
nationality lines. The main premise is that foreign banks would make higher loan loss 
provisions due to a more stringent management. However, this effect may be dampened by 
the fact that foreign banks may engage in a better screening process of loan applicants and 
thus increase the quality of their portfolio which will render the need for loans loss provisions 
less acute. Domestic banks, regardless of type of ownership are expected to have lower loan 
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loss provisions relying on the government to bail them out in time of crisis. However, with 
increased, financial regulation the negative sign of domestic ownership may be dampened.  
A main flaw of the dataset is the few observations of non-performing loans (NPL) 
which would provide vital information about the soundness of the banks and would throw 
more light on the LLR ratio. Therefore, since very few banks reported their NPL, the LLR 
ratio attempts to proxy for it. However, it is not closely correlated with NPL since besides 
NPL, it also captures the effect of financial monitoring and willingness of the government to 
lend help in times of difficulty.  
Finally, the macroeconomic controls have predictable signs. GDP growth and a high 
real interest rate are expected to positively affect the performance variables. Inflation is 
expected to have a negative effect on all performance measures except loans, since in high 
inflationary environment, the perceived real interest rate on loans falls. Additionally, 
profitability and the level of loans are expected to rise with time as market efficiency 
increases while administrative costs should fall. The net interest margin is also expected to 
decrease with time as markets become more competitive and loan loss reserves may fall if the 
quality of portfolio improves with time or increase reflecting improved financial regulations. 
 Similarly for the SFA approach, private ownership, regardless of the nationally of the 
owners is expected to have positive effect on both profit and cost efficiency. Foreign 
greenfield establishments are expected to have the greatest positive influence with foreign 
privatized entities following. As in the Ratio Approach, cost and profit efficiency is expected 
to rise with market share and time due to the bandwagon effect and increased competitiveness 
respectively. 
 
4.2. DISCUSSION OF THE ESTIMATED COEFFICIENTS OF CONTROL VARIABLES FOR THE 
RATIO APPROACH  
 
  Tables 1 to 6 show the estimated coefficients for control variables using Ordinary 
Least Squares with heteroskedastic-consistent standard errors. Tracking the effect of the same 
control variables across equations, we see that some are uniformly consistent, while others 
yield surprising results across various equations. Contrary to expectations, the ratio of market 
share to loans has a negative effect on the ratio of administrative costs to total assets, albeit a 
statistically insignificant one except for the last specification. This suggests that market 
control allows banks to be more efficient in their nonproductive expenditures. A similar 
picture emerges when the ratio of loans over assets is the dependent variable: higher market 
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share is associated with fewer loans probably reflecting the fact that bigger banks reorient 
their main activities away from loans to other financial activities. Quite predictably, the 
market share has a positive effect on net interest margin reflecting potential gains from 
monopoly although in only two of the five specifications the effect is statistically significant. 
A rather complicated picture emerges from the ROE, ROA and loan loss reserves equations. 
Although market share is uniformly insignificant, it attains different signs depending on the 
other controls included. When only market share is included in the equations, its effect on the 
dependent variables is negative, while when it is also interacted with the ownership 
structures, the main variable assumes a positive sign while the interaction variables have 
uniformly negative signs.  While the decreased profitability for major banks is at odds with 
their privileged position as central financial players, it may be a result of the fact that the 
survey was taken at a time when banks experience active restructuring in transitioning to 
competitive markets and short-term profitability may not have been their immediate goal. 
The reduction of the share of loan loss reserves for larger banks may be due to various 
factors: it could be a co-effect of the general reduction of the share of loans in the portfolio or 
to more stringent loan auditing that larger entities could afford or that the increased 
importance of the bank for the economy would make it more difficult for the government to 
let it go bankrupt in times of financial downturn.  
The ratio of loans to assets has a negative sign in the equations where net interest 
margin and loan loss reserves over loans are the dependent variables, however, it is a 
statistically insignificant one. As expected, the increased number of loans reduces the interest 
spread since profits come from the volume of loans not from the individual rates charged. In 
the case of the loan loss reserves over loans equation, it probably reflects a trend of increased 
monitoring and thus lower necessity of loan loss reserves in institutions that handle a larger 
volume of loans.  
The effect ratio of cash to total assets has negligibly positive and statistically 
insignificant effect on net interest margin and loan loss reserves. The influence of non-
earning assets on ROE is predictably negative but insignificant one. A little surprisingly, 
more cash is associated with higher ROA. Rather than being a cause and effect the two 
factors may be an outcome of the same causation, namely increased loans, which directly 
contribute to profitability, but also require more cash for servicing.   
The ratio of loan loss reserves to loans has positive but insignificant sign only for two 
specifications out of five for both the administrative costs and loans over assets 
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specifications. In the rest of equations it has the expected negative sign but the effect is 
statistically insignificant. 
Quite expectedly, increased interest spread is associated with higher administrative 
costs probably a resultant of the fact that banks, which enjoy a wider interest spread, can 
afford more bloated personnel expenses. Finally, the ratio of administrative costs to total 
assets has a positive albeit an insignificant effect on loan loss reserves reflecting increased 
staffing costs in handling non-performing loans. 
The macrocontrol variables yield some surprising outcomes. Although GDP growth is 
supposed to positively affect all dependent variables, it exhibits consistently positive but 
statistically insignificant coefficients only for the administrative costs, loans over assets and 
ROE specifications. However, higher GDP growth is associated with lower ROA, net interest 
margin and loan loss reserves, although none of the coefficients are significant.  
Inflation has a positive sign only in the net interest margin specification probably 
accounting for widened interest spread that the depreciating currency can cause. The only 
surprising outcome is the one in the loans to asset ratio, where the expected positive effect of 
the attractiveness of loans in times of depreciating currency is outweighed by the economic 
burden it imposes. 
Quite predictably the real interest rate has a negative effect on ROE, ROA, 
administrative costs, loans over assets and net interest margin, although only the last one is 
statistically significant. Contrary to expectations, the real interest rate has a negative effect on 
loan loss reserves probably reflecting decreased demand for loans as the price of loaned funds 
increases.  
As predicted, time affects positively ROA and ROE, and negatively administrative 
costs, net interest margin and loan loss reserves. It comes as a little surprising that time would 
positively affect negatively the ratio of loans to assets, but it may reflect a shift away from 
loan quantity toward loan quality in the process of adapting to the demands of a competitive 
market. 
Finally, the last column in all specifications includes country controls with Bulgaria 
being the base case. Most of the countries do not have statistically significant effect on the 
dependant variables with a few exceptions. All banks, except Hungarian and Latvian ones 
have lower administrative costs than Bulgarian ones while the effect is significant only for 
the Czech Republic, Hungary and Slovenia. Similarly, while banks in the Czech Republic and 
Slovenia operate significantly fewer loans than their Bulgarian counterparts, these in Hungary 
significantly outmatch all the surveyed countries. Banks in all countries without exceptions 
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have a statistically significant lower net interest margin than Bulgarian ones probably 
accounting for the hyperinflationary environment in which Bulgarian banks operated in the 
beginning of the observed period. Banks in Latvia, Lithuania, Poland, Romania and Slovenia 
have higher ROE than these in Bulgaria while banks in Hungary, Latvia and Lithuania have a 
higher ROA than these in Bulgaria although none of these effects are statistically significant. 
On the other hand, Latvian banks, probably reflecting better monitoring, provide less for 
covering non-performing loans. 
 
4.3. DISCUSSION OF THE ESTIMATED COEFFICIENTS OF OWNERSHIP VARIABLES FOR THE 
RATIO APPROACH 
 
In the equation for administrative costs over loans foreign greenfield ownership and 
occasionally foreign privatized ownership have the wrong sign that suggests that state banks 
have lower administrative costs than foreign banks and it is significant for three of the six 
specifications. This may reflect a temporary trend in which administrative costs increase for 
foreign greenfield banks reflecting initial establishment costs. Banks privatized to foreign 
investors have lower administrative costs than state-owned banks for half of the 
specifications and in two out of the three cases the reduction in administrative costs is greater 
than that for banks privatized to domestic owners. Again this may be a transitional feature 
rather than a permanent characteristic. Foreign investors go through an initial period of 
adjustment to the local market that puts them at disadvantage compared to domestic owners. 
This notion is supported by the ownership and time interactions, which suggest that for both 
types of privatized banks, foreign and domestic, administrative costs fall with time. Only 
when ownership types are interacted with the bank’s market share do two of the ownership 
types, namely, foreign greenfield and foreign privatized banks exhibit lower administrative 
costs compared with state-owned banks, which suggests that the effect of ownership on 
administrative costs depends on the size of the enterprise. 
The loans over assets equations reveal another surprising effect of private ownership, 
namely all privately owned banks, except foreign greenfield ones, handle fewer loans than 
state banks. Only foreign greenfield banks operate more loans than state banks and the effect 
is statistically significant in three of the six specifications. In the remaining cases, although 
statistically insignificant, this outcome could hardly be viewed as undesirable. It could be 
explained with the improved management on the part of private owners that shifts away from 
quantity toward quality. This policy substitutes the volume of loans with improved portfolio 
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by means of improved monitoring and attracting superior borrowers. Among privatized 
banks, these sold to foreign investors exhibit lower reduction in loans than these with 
domestic owners for four out of the six specifications. This effect is reversed when ownership 
is interacted with the size of the financial institution signifying that this trend is in force only 
for niche banks while private market-controlling financial institutions operate more loans 
than their state-owned counterparts except for foreign greenfield banks. Finally, banks 
privatized to foreign investors tend to increase the volume of loans with time while these 
privatized to domestic owners do not. 
 The effect of ownership differs across specifications for the net interest margin 
equation. When no controls are included as in column (1) and only bank-specific controls are 
included as in column (2), only banks privatized to foreign owners have a statistically 
significant positive effect on net interest margin. However, this may be a result of the fact 
that banks privatized to foreign owners are often big formerly state entities that still retain a 
significant share of the financial market and are able to enjoy a wider interest spread that 
generates higher profits. In some of the subsequent specifications this effect is sometimes 
reversed as in (3) which shows that domestic privatized banks have higher profitability than 
foreign privatized ones and all private banks have higher profitability than state banks, and 
this effect is statistically significant for foreign M&A banks, domestic de novo and domestic 
privatized entities. The original status quo is restored in column (4), only to be reversed again 
in the last two columns. However, the initial notion is supported by the fact that when 
interacted with the market share, privatized foreign ownership has a positive effect on net 
interest margin, while the effect of privatized domestic ownership is negative and statistically 
significant. Interacted with time, foreign private ownership increases profitability more than 
domestic privatized ownership. In this sense, foreign privatized banks exhibit superior and 
improving profitability than domestic privatized ones, whose sign is negative.  
Quite expectedly, private banks, regardless of ownership type have higher values of 
ROE and ROA than state-run entities. Among these, banks privatized to foreign owners, in 
almost all specifications outperform banks privatized to domestic owners, and frequently, 
even foreign greenfield banks. Although in none of the specifications are the coefficients 
statistically significant, this sweeping superiority supports the general claim that banks 
privatized to foreign owners utilize a better management of their resources than these 
privatized to domestic owners. Foreign know-how and longer experience in competitive 
markets seems to play in integral role in improving bank profitability.   
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Finally, foreign-owned banks, greenfield, privatized and M&A, have lower loan loss 
reserves relative to loans distributed compared to state-run entities, while domestic de novo 
have higher ratios in all columns and domestic privatized in two of the specifications. In all 
specifications banks privatized to foreign investors have higher and statistically significant 
reduction in loan loss reserves than banks privatized to domestic owners. This trend could be 
explained with the fact that due to improved performance and superior monitoring practices 
foreign-owned banks “cherry-pick” the better borrowers and can afford to hold a lower ratio 
of loan loss reserves to loans. On the other hand, private domestic banks, lacking 
governmental shelter, opt for an internal insurance against non-performing loans in form of 
increased ratio of loan loss reserves to loans. Since the data does not permit observations of 
non-performing loans directly, we can infer that foreign banks must clearly have a lower ratio 
of NPL, while the opposite may not be true for domestic ones. For them, it may be an 
indicator of risk aversion, rather than the state of the portfolio.  
The Ratio Approach shows that while the effect of foreign privatized ownership tends 
to be ambiguous in terms of cost efficiency, in terms of profitability and portfolio quality, 
banks privatized to foreign investors outperform these privatized to domestic owners. 
 
4.4. DISCUSSION OF THE ESTIMATED COEFFICIENTS OF OWNERSHIP VARIABLES FOR THE 
STOCHASTIC FRONTIER APPROACH 
 
 Table 7 presents the results of the Stochastic Frontier Approach where the efficiency 
estimates for both profit and cost are obtained with an ITSUR regression and then regressed 
on the ownership dummies in a Tobit estimate.  
 Market size has a positive and statistically significant effect on both cost and profit 
efficiency suggesting that efficiency rises with the size of the bank. Additionally, both 
efficiency scores improve with time as countries transition to better-organized financial 
markets. 
Although not all of the ownership dummies are significant (in line with the pattern 
developed in the Ratio Approach), some important implications about the effect ownership 
emerge. In both estimates, foreign ownership of privatized banks has statistically significant 
effect on profit and cost efficiency. Banks privatized to foreign owners achieve statistically 
significant higher profit and cost efficiency than unprivatized banks, while these privatized to 
domestic owners do so only for the profit efficiency equation. In both specifications, foreign 
privatized banks emerge as more efficient than domestic privatized banks. An interesting 
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observation is that for both profit and cost efficiency estimates, foreign privatized banks 
outperform foreign greenfield banks. While foreign greenfield entities achieve higher profit 
efficiency than state ones, their cost efficiency is lower than that of state banks. A plausible 
explanation for this trend may be the fact that privatized banks are large entities with a long 
presence on the market which would enable them to hold onto previously amassed experience 
versus small and often specialized greenfield entrants which face initial costs in adapting to 
the domestic market. 
 Overall, the results from the Stochastic Frontier Approach echo these of the Ratio 
Approach. While both methods yield insignificant coefficients for some of the ownership 
dummies, the majority of the coefficients have signs and degrees of impact that suggest that 
banks privatized to foreign owners have superior profitability indicators, achieve better 
portfolios and exhibit higher degree of managerial efficiency than banks privatized to 
domestic owners. The fact that not all of these trends are statistically significant may be 
partly due to the recent nature of the bank reforms in the transitional states. I expect this trend 
to become more pronounced as time progresses. Nevertheless, foreign ownership emerges as 
the better choice for policy-makers looking to privatize their financial institutions regardless 
of the macroeconomic setting of the host country. The experience of the ten transitional states 
shows that fears of foreign entry are often unjustified and the benefits for both the privatized 
entity and the sector as a whole outweigh the strains associated with liberalizing the market to 
foreign influence. 
 
5. CONCLUSION 
 The collapse of the centrally planned economies witnessed the biggest privatization 
initiative so far that completely transformed the financial markets of the countries in Central 
and Eastern Europe. As a result, many stare-run banks were privatized and independent 
private enterprises have been set up. This study aims to assess the benefit of privatizing banks 
to strategic foreign investors as opposed to selling to domestic owners.  
Despite the limitations of the dataset, some important conclusions emerge. The two 
approaches adopted, namely the Ratio Approach and the Stochastic Frontier Approach show 
that banks privatized to foreign owners outperform these sold to domestic owners across all 
measures: profitability level, portfolio quality and managerial efficiency. The fact that not all 
of these trends are statistically significant may be partly due to the recent nature of the bank 
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reforms in the transitional states. I expect this trend to become more pronounced once the 
initial restructuring is over. Nevertheless, foreign ownership emerges as the better alternative 
for privatizing state-run banks that benefits both the entity itself and the domestic financial 
market as a whole by increasing competitiveness and the array of services offered The 
experience of the ten transitional states (Bulgaria, Czech Republic, Estonia, Hungary, Latvia, 
Lithuania, Poland, Romania, Slovakia, and Slovenia) shows that fears of foreign entry are 
often unjustified and the benefits for both the privatized entity and the sector as a whole 
outweigh the strains associated with liberalizing the market to foreign influence. 
Nevertheless, the fact that privatization is a very recent process does not permit the 
emergence of definite conclusions about the effect of foreign ownership on the performance 
of privatized banks as opposed to domestic ownership. Replicating the same or a similar 
study in a decade would allow to pinpoint the long term effects of various types of ownership 
on bank performance irrespective of initial adjustment trends. Furthermore, as banks fully 
adopt western accounting practices, future works would be able to access more detailed 
balance sheets that would allow more precise modeling of the data and the inclusion of 
variables such as non-performing loans, which at present time are unavailable for the 
majority of the banks surveyed.   
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Table 1. 
 
Dependent Variable is Administrative Costs/Assets 
Ordinary Least Squares with Heteroskedastic-Consistent Standard Errors 
  1 2 3 4 5 6 
Foreign Greenfield 1.301* 1.289* 1.566* 1.577 2.162 1.543 
 1.715 1.703 1.718 0.830 1.005 0.828 
Foreign Privatized -0.030* -0.117 -0.110 0.042 0.082 0.088 
 -1.829 -1.473 -1.373 0.201 0.326 0.203 
Foreign M&A -0.030* -0.157 -0.195 -0.113 -0.118 -1.392 
 -1.805 -1.574 -1.561 -0.577 -0.524 -1.595 
Domestic Greenfield -0.008 -0.001 -0.116 0.297 0.187 -0.553 
 -0.448 -0.017 -0.996 1.003 0.649 -1.355 
Domestic Privatized -0.021 -0.106 -0.318 0.051 -0.408 -0.033 
 -1.186 -0.915 -1.527 0.153 -1.283 -0.104 
Bank Controls NO YES YES YES YES YES 
Size Controls NO NO YES NO YES YES 
Time Controls NO NO NO YES YES YES 
Macro Controls NO YES YES YES YES YES 
Country Controls NO NO NO NO NO YES 
R-squared 0.029 0.035 0.045 0.038 0.049 0.178 
 
 
 
Table 2. 
 
Dependent Variable is Loans/Assets 
Ordinary Least Squares with Heteroskedastic-Consistent Standard Errors 
  1 2 3 4 5 6 
Foreign Greenfield 11.896* 11.959* 14.438* 15.936 21.458 15.888 
 1.665 1.681 1.685 0.886 1.040 0.906 
Foreign Privatized -0.511 -1.334* -1.400 -0.777 -0.441 -0.362 
 -1.361 -1.645 -1.620 -0.301 -0.150 -0.084 
Foreign M&A -0.458 -1.691* -2.056* -1.961 -1.964 -13.656* 
 -1.222 -1.694 -1.665 -0.824 -0.746 -1.657 
Domestic Greenfield -0.581 -0.387 -1.598 1.523 0.357 -6.247 
 -1.548 -0.490 -1.350 0.475 0.113 -1.584 
Domestic Privatized -0.536 -1.267 -3.388 -0.401 -4.857 -1.424 
 -1.424 -1.088 -1.643 -0.113 -1.393  -0.438 
Bank Controls NO YES YES YES YES YES 
Size Controls NO NO YES NO YES YES 
Time Controls NO NO NO YES YES YES 
Macro Controls NO YES YES YES YES YES 
Country Controls NO NO NO NO NO YES 
R-squared 0.029 0.035 0.045 0.038 0.049 0.178 
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Table 3. 
 
Dependent Variable is Net Interest Margin 
Ordinary Least Squares with Heteroskedastic-Consistent Standard Errors 
  1 2 3 4 5 6 
Foreign Greenfield -0.006 -0.026* 0.012 -0.010 0.008 0.001 
 -0.455 -1.873 0.976 -0.351 0.419 0.040 
Foreign Privatized 0.102** 0.101** 0.023 -0.001 -0.061 -0.065 
 2.385 2.503 1.101 -0.008 -0.803 -0.973 
Foreign M&A -0.020* -0.018 0.020* -0.017 0.012 0.015 
 -1.755 -1.496 1.921 -0.645 0.744 0.741 
Domestic Greenfield 0.005 -0.010 0.041*** 0.001 0.048** 0.050** 
 0.398 -0.673 3.360 0.026 2.551 2.236 
Domestic Privatized -0.007 -0.019 0.038*** -0.045 0.018 -0.005 
 -0.553 -1.130 2.959 -1.211 0.828 -0.145 
Bank Controls NO YES YES YES YES YES 
Size Controls NO NO YES NO YES YES 
Time Controls NO NO NO YES YES YES 
Macro Controls NO YES YES YES YES YES 
Country Controls NO NO NO NO NO YES 
R-squared 0.084 0.129 0.350 0.139 0.356 0.468 
 
 
Table 4. 
 
Dependent Variable is ROE 
Ordinary Least Squares with Heteroskedastic-Consistent Standard Errors 
  1 2 3 4 5 6 
Foreign Greenfield 9.783 7.323 9.463 21.511 23.397 20.867 
 0.999 1.007 1.010 0.989 0.993 0.983 
Foreign Privatized 9.773 8.570 12.174 22.111 24.272 21.140 
 0.998 0.999 0.997 0.986 0.986 0.958 
Foreign M&A 9.719 8.263 11.004 18.401 20.259 12.453 
 0.992 0.990 0.999 0.981 0.986 0.955 
Domestic Greenfield 9.495 7.670 9.790 19.322 20.660 12.354 
 0.969 0.967 0.973 0.945 0.947 0.883 
Domestic Privatized 9.777 7.019 8.695 17.379 17.406 5.490 
 0.998 0.994 1.005 0.965 0.972 0.734 
Bank Controls NO YES YES YES YES YES 
Size Controls NO NO YES NO YES YES 
Time Controls NO NO NO YES YES YES 
Macro Controls NO YES YES YES YES YES 
Country Controls NO NO NO NO NO YES 
R-squared 0.011 0.023 0.026 0.027 0.030 0.051 
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Table 5. 
 
Dependent Variable is ROA 
Ordinary Least Squares with Heteroskedastic-Consistent Standard Errors 
  1 2 3 4 5 6 
Foreign Greenfield 0.573 0.290 0.360 -0.790 -0.716 -0.860 
 1.243 1.116 1.139 -0.826 -0.796 -0.854 
Foreign Privatized 0.049 0.005 0.033 0.288 0.296 0.283 
 0.874 0.077 0.419 1.124 1.108 1.040 
Foreign M&A 0.043 -0.013 -0.012 0.178 0.179 -0.162 
 0.773 -0.180 -0.128 0.777 0.757 -0.410 
Domestic Greenfield 0.027 0.009 -0.014 0.145 0.137 -0.153 
 0.481 0.163 -0.169 0.642 0.585 -0.501 
Domestic Privatized 0.052 0.000 -0.046 0.212 0.185 0.283 
 0.918 0.005 -0.390 0.931 0.775 1.230 
Bank Controls NO YES YES YES YES YES 
Size Controls NO NO YES NO YES YES 
Time Controls NO NO NO YES YES YES 
Macro Controls NO YES YES YES YES YES 
Country Controls NO NO NO NO NO YES 
R-squared 0.014 0.110 0.111 0.121 0.122 0.144 
 
 
 
 
Table 6. 
 
Dependent Variable is Loan Loss Reserves/Loans 
Ordinary Least Squares with Heteroskedastic-Consistent Standard Errors 
  1 2 3 4 5 6 
Foreign Greenfield -0.115*** -0.137***
-
0.155*** -0.212 -0.258* -0.251
 -3.717 -2.783 -2.607 -1.482 -1.738 -1.413
Foreign Privatized -0.090*** -0.106** -0.111** -0.082 -0.085 -0.238*
 -2.901 -2.398 -2.179 -0.580 -0.620 -1.661
Foreign M&A -0.116*** -0.126** -0.174** -0.264* -0.309* -0.265
 -3.789 -2.553 -2.432 -1.813 -1.923 -1.551
Domestic Greenfield 0.251 0.324 0.373 0.637 0.697 1.044
 1.159 1.282 1.369 1.253 1.296 1.484
Domestic Privatized -0.073** 0.021 -0.031 0.029 -0.161 -0.055
 -2.193 0.270 -0.556 0.137 -1.225 -0.325
Bank Controls NO YES YES YES YES YES
Size Controls NO NO YES NO YES YES
Time Controls NO NO NO YES YES YES
Macro Controls NO YES YES YES YES YES
Country Controls NO NO NO NO NO YES
R-squared 0.021 0.062 0.065 0.070 0.073 0.119
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   Table 7. 
 
Tobit Estimates 
 Profit Efficiency Cost Efficiency
Constant 0.972*** 0.894***
 68.074 19.736
Foreign Greenfield 0.006** -0.064
   0.404 -1.300
Foreign Privatized 0.061*** 0.259***
 3.257 4.391
Foreign M&A -0.007 -0.030
 -0.365 -0.519
Domestic Greenfield -0.000 -0.109**
 -0.003 -2.240
Domestic Privatized   0.045* 0.011
 1.681 0.135
Market Share 1.698***   1.208***
 4.690 10.037
Time 0.006* 0.023**
 1.698 1.986
 
 
 
T-statistics is below coefficients for each variable. 
*  denotes significance at the 10% double-sided level. 
**  denotes significance at the 5% double-sided level. 
***  denotes significance at the 1% double-sided level. 
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